## SPAR - BRAMPTON (SSS)

9445 AIRPORT RD

## Critical Items List

SRMS

CIL Ref#: 2931

Revision: 0

FMEA Rev: 0

BRAMPTON ONTARIO L684J3

System: SRMS

Subsystem: ELECTRICAL SUB-SYSTEM

Assembly Desc: Servo Power Amplifier

Part Number(s): 51140F1177-3

51140F1177-5

item:

Function: Motor Drive Amplifier Assembly

Provides motor voltage based on demand from tachometer electronics.

Commutates the motor drive voltage. Provides hardware current limiting, brake drive, direct drive functions and enables backup drive. Provides BITE circuits and

BITE verification for MDA.

Failure Mode: Short of one of six brake control blocking diodes.

H/W Func. Screen Failures

Criticality: 3 2R Al

Mission Phase: Orbit

Cause(s): Motor Drive Amplifier Assembly

Backup brake control blocking diode falls short. Brake bus brake control blocking diode falls short. Direct Drive brake control blocking diode falls short.

## Failure effect on unit/end item:

No effect until subsequent failure. Redundant diode still available. Subsequent diode short results in loss of isolation between the brake bus, main bus or backup select line and the other two sources of brake drive. Subsequent failure will cause one or more of the following to occur.

(1) When backup drive is selected the brake current sense resistor (R318) will open circuit causing a loss of computer supported and direct drive modes for the failed joint due to the backup select being shorted to brake bus or main bus, (2) All joint brakes will be lifted when failed joint is driven in Direct due to brake bus being shorted to main bus, or (3) The backup relay and backup commutator are activated causing a backup relay BITE when the brakes are OFF due to the the backup selected line being shorted to the brake bus or main bus.

Worst Case: No effect until subsequent failure.

Redundant Paths: Redundant diode.

## letention Rationale

### Design:

Discrete semiconductor devices are specified to at least the TX level of MIL-S-19500. Samples of all procured kits/date codes are subjected to destructive physical analysis (DPA) to verify the integrity of the manufacturing processes. Particle impact Noise Detection (PIND) screening is performed on microcincuits, translator and diodes that are mounted in a package with an internal cavity construction. The purpose of the test is to detect loose particles in the package, usually resulting from the assembly process. Device stress levels are dereted in accordance with SPAR-RMS-PA.003 and varified by design review.

The SPA board is fabricated using Surface Mount Tachnology (SMT). This is a PWB assembly technology in which the components are soldered to the solder pads on the surface of the PWB. The significant advantage of this technology is to enable the parts on the board to be more densely packed, to reduce to overall volume and weight of the assembly.

The assembly process is highly automated. The parts are mounted on the boards using a computer controlled "pick and place" machine. The subsequent soldering operation is performed using a belt furrace, in which the time and temperature thermal profile that the PWB assembly is exposed to is tightly controlled and optimized to ensure proper part soldering attachment. The assembly is manufactured under documented procedures and quality controls. These controls are exercised throughout the assembly, inspection, and testing of the unit. This inspection includes workmanship, component mounting, soldering, and conformal coating to ensure that it is in advordance with the NHS 5300 standards.

The SMT line used for the SPA PWS assembly has undergone a full qualification program, and assemblies produced on this line are used in other space programs.

The circuit beard design has been reviewed to ensure adequate conductor width and separation and to confirm appropriate dimensions of solder packs and of component hold provisions. Parts mounting methods are controlled in accordance with MSFC-STD-154A. MSFC-STD-135 and SASD 2573751. These documents require approved mounting methods, stress relief and component security.

Supersedes: N/A

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#### Test:

QUALIFICATION TESTS - The SPA is subjected to the following qualification testing:

ViSRATION: Each axis of the QM is subjected to Flight Acceptance Vibration Test (FAVT), Qualification Acceptance Vibration Test (QAVT), and Qualification Vibration Tests (QVT) in accordance with the SPA Vibration Test Procedure (826586). The level and duration for FAVT is at per Figure 8 and Table 2 of 826586; the level and duration for QAVT is as per Figure 8 and Table of 826586. At the end of the three successive fundom vibration test in each axis, both directions (+/-) of each of the axis is subjected to a shock pulse test as per Figure 9 of 826586.

THERMADVACUUM: QM TVAC Test is in accordance with Figure 5 of the SPA TVAC Test Procedure (526598), with full Functional/Parametric Test performed at levels of +60 degrees C and -96 degrees C, and non-operating at -54 degrees C. The Qualification vacuum levels during TVAC at 1X10\*\*-6 for or less. The total test duration is 7 1/2 cycles. The QM SPA is subjected to a minimum of 1000 nours of life testing and 1000 power Qn-Off cycles.

EMC: The QM is subjected to EMC Testing (tests CE01/CE03, CE07, CS01, CS02, CS08, RE02, RS02, and RS03) in accordance with the SPA EMC test Procedure (826477) based on MIL-STD-461A.

UNIT FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE TESTS - The FM SPA is subjected to the following acceptance testing:

VIBRATION: FM Acceptance Vibration Test (AVT) in accordance with the SPA Vibration Test Procedure (826596), with level and duration as per Figure 6 and Table 2 of 826586.

THERMAL/VACUUM: FM TVAC Test is in accordance with Figure 8 of the SPA TVAC Test Procedure (826988), with levels of +49 degrees and -25 degrees 0 for a duration of 1 1/2 cycles. The vacuum levels during Acceptance TVAC Test is 1X10\*\*-5 torr or less.

JOINT SRU TESTS - The SPA is tested as part of the joints (ambient and vibration tests only). The ambient ATP for the Shoulder Joint, Elbow Joint, and Wrist Joint are as per ATP.2001, ATP.2003, and ATP.2005 respectively. The vibration test for the Shoulder Joint, and Elbow or Wrist Joint are as per ATP.2004, ATP.2004 and ATP.2005 respectively. Through wire function, continuity and electrical isotation tests are performed per TP.293.

MECHANICAL ARM REASSEMBLY - The SPA's/John's undergo a mechanical arm integration stage where electrical checks are performed per TP.2007.

MECHANICAL ARM TESTING - The outgoing split-erm is configured on the Strongback and the Manipulator Arm Checkout is performed per ATP.1932.

FLIGHT CHECKOUT: PDRS OPS Checkout (all vehicles) JSC 18987.

### inspection:

Units are manufactured under documented quality controls. These controls are exercised throughout design procurement, planning, receiving, processing, fabrication, assembly, testing and shipping of the units. Mandatory inspection points are employed at various stages of fabrication, assembly, and test. Government source inspection is invaked at various control levels.

EEE parts inspection is performed as required by SPAR-RMS-PA.003. Each EEE part is qualified at the part level to the requirements of the applicable specification. All EEE parts are 100% screened and burned-in, as a minimum, as required by SPAR-RMS-PA.003, by the supplier. DPA is performed as required by PA.003 on a randomly selected 5% of parts, maximum 5 pieces, minimum 3 pieces for each lot number/date code of parts received. All cavity devices are subjected to 100% PIND. Wire is procured to specification MIL-W-22759 or MIL-W-81381 and inspected and tested to NASA JSCM8080 Standard Number 95A.

Receiving inspection varifies that all parts received are as identified in the procurement documents, that no physical damage has occurred to parts during shipment, that the receiving documents provide adequate traceability information and acreening data clearly identifies acceptable parts.

Parts are inspected throughout manufacture and assembly as appropriate to the manufacturing stage completed. These inspections include:

Printed circuit board inspection for track separation, damage and adequacy of plated through holes, component mounting inspection for correct soldering, wire looping, strapping, atc. Operators and inspectors are trained and certified to NASA NHB 5300.4(3A-1) Standard.

Conformal coating inspection for adequate processing is performed using ultraviolet light techniques. P.C. Board installation inspection includes checks for correct board installation, alignment of boards, proper connector contact matting, wire routing, strapping of wires etc. Post P.C. Soard installation inspection includes chemicises and workmanship (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection point).

Unit Pre-Acceptance Test inspection, which includes an audit of lower ter inspection completion, as built configuration verification to as design site (mandatory inspection point). A unit Test Readiness Review (TRR) which includes verification of test personnel, test documents, built equipment calibration/validation status and hardware configuration is convened by QA in conjunction with Engineering, Reliability, Configuration Control, Supplier as applicable, and the government representative, prior to the start of any formal testing (Acceptance or Qualification). Unit level Acceptance Testing (ATP) includes ambient performance, thermal and vibration testing (Spar/government representation).

Integration of unit to Joint SRU - Inspections include grounding checks, connectors for best or pushback contacts, visual, cleanliness, interconnect value and power up test to the appropriate Joint Inspection Test Procedure (ITP). Joint level Pre-Acceptance Test Inspection, includes an audit of lower tier inspection completion, as built configuration verification to as design etc. Joint level Acceptance Testing (ATP) includes ambient and vibration testing (Spar/government rep. mandatory Inspection point).

Mechanical Arm Reassembly - the integration of mechanical arm subassemblies to form the assembled arm, inspections are performed at each phase of integration which includes electrical checks, through wiring checks, wiring routing, interface connectors for bent or pushback contacts etc. Mechanical Arm Testing - Strongback and flat floor ambient performance test (Spar/government rep. mandatory inspection pol

OMRSD Offline: None until subsequent failure. Upon subsequent failure verify Direct Orive capability,

Prepared: 25Sep96 by Fung, Bill

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BRAMPTON ONTARIO L6S4J3

OMRSD Online None. Installation:

OMRSD Online None until subacquent failure. Upon subsequent failure venty Direct Drive capability.

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Turnaround:

Screen Failure: A: Short circuit cannot be detected because redundant hardware items are series connected and are not individually instrumented.

B: Short circuit cannot be detected because redundant hardware items are series connected and are not individually instrumented.

C: Pass

Grew Training: The crew will be trained to always observe whether the arm is responding properly to commands. If it len't, apply brakes.

Crew Action: None.

Operational Effect: None. Arm will not stop automatically after a subsequent failure. Unannunesated.

Mission None. Constraints:

unctional Group	Name	Position	Telephone	Date Signed	Status
ngineer	Hiltz, Michael / SPAR-BRAMPTON	Systems Engineer	4634	06Mar98	Signed
teliability	Molgaard, Lena / SPAR-BRAMPTON	Reliability Engineer	4590	08Mar98	Signed
rogram Management Offic	Rice, Craig / SPAR-BRAMPTON	Technical Program Manager	4892	06Mar98	Signed
iubsystem Manager	Glenn, George / JSC-ER	RMS Subsystem Manager	(281) 483-1518	30Mar98	Signed
ectivical Manager	Allison, Ron / JSC-MV6	RMS Project Engineer JSC	(713) 483-4072	09Apr98	Signed